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Abstract
Einstein claimed that the fundamental dynamical insight of special rel-
ativity was the equivalence of mass and energy. I disagree. Not only
are mass and energy not equivalent (whatever exactly that means) but
talk of such equivalence obscures the real dynamical insight of spe-
cial relativity, which concerns the nature of 4-forces and interactions
more generally. In this paper I present and defend a new ontology of
special relativistic particle dynamics that makes this insight perspicu-
ous and I explain how alleged cases of mass–energy conversion can be
accommodated within that ontology.
1 Introduction
Special Relativity is widely recognized as having transformed our under-
standing of the relationship between energy and mass.1 Over a decade after
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1In the words of one mathematician–historian, the energy–mass relationship brought
about by special relativity constitutes “the most striking example of unification that has
been effected in the present century”. (Whittaker, 1958, p.96)
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the theory’s development, Einstein wrote that the special relativistic recon-
ceptualization of the mass–energy relationship, as expressed in the equation
E = mc2, was the theory’s most important and lasting contribution to our
understanding of the physical world—not the relativity of simultaneity, time
dilation, or length contraction.2 When one reflects on the role this equation
played in the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy—processes
in which mass is apparently converted into energy—it’s difficult to disagree.
Mass and energy seem to bear a substantive physical connection to each
other in the relativistic context that is quite unlike their classical relation-
ship.
Although the mathematical expressions relating mass and energy are
straightforward, the precise nature of the physical reconceptualization re-
mains poorly understood. Are mass and energy the same physical property,
or are they instead distinct but related quantities? What does it mean to say
that mass is “converted” into energy (or energy into mass)? Does E = mc2
suggest some new, non-classical ontology of mass and energy?
The slogans physicists use to characterize the mass–energy relationship
provide little clarity. d’Inverno (1992) writes that
[E = mc2] is not just a mathematical relationship between two different
quantities, namely energy and mass, but rather states that energy and
mass are equivalent concepts. (48)3
Faraoni (2013) puts the relationship in a seemingly different way:
[E = mc2] expresses the fact that a free particle possesses energy just
because it has mass, and that a small mass can free up an enormous
amount of energy because the factor c2 is large in ordinary units (as
2Einstein (1919, p.230). See also Rindler (1991, p.73)
3See also French (1968, pp.16–20), Sternheim and Kane (1991, p.493), and Torretti
(1983, pp.306–307, n.13), who equate energy and mass either conceptually or metaphysi-
cally. This view is echoed in the philosophical literature by, e.g., Butterfield (1984, p.104),
Earman (1989, p.18), and Teller (1991, p.382).
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demonstrated in nuclear reactions and nuclear bombs): this is the
equivalence of mass and energy. (144)4
Do these authors agree on the nature of the alleged equivalence? Strikingly,
Bondi and Spurgin (1987) reject any apparent equivalence between mass
and energy:
Mass and energy are not interconvertible. They are entirely different
quantities and are no more interconvertible than are mass and volume,
which also happen to be related by an equation, V = mρ−1...The best
way to appreciate Einstein’s conclusion is to realise that energy has
mass...[All] should be warned against believing erroneous statements
that mass and energy are interconvertible, and they should be urged
to avoid such terminology as ‘the equivalence of mass and energy’.
(62–63)
Evidently, not all of these physicists can be right.
This paper proposes a new ontology for the dynamics of special rela-
tivistic particles that is motivated by an attempt to clarify the relationship
between energy and mass, as understanding that relationship is ultimately
grounded in what the fundamental physical properties of particles are. I
argue that energy and mass are not equivalent: the appearance of inter-
conversion is the product of an inadequate (if ubiquitous) view of the un-
derlying dynamics.5 On the view developed here, the surprising and central
dynamical insight of special relativity lies not in any relationship between
energy and mass, as Einstein claimed, but rather in the nature of interac-
tions between particles mediated by 4-forces in Minkowski spacetime.6
4Helliwell (2010, pp.143–152) expresses a similar view, whereas Rindler (1991, pp.81–
84) seems to combine both passages.
5Flores (2005) identifies six interpretations of Einstein’s equation represented in the
literature on special relativity, tentatively endorsing the view that mass and energy are
inequivalent physical properties that can—but need not—be converted into each other. I
think that both his positive argument and his grounds for rejecting several of the compet-
ing interpretations rest on conceptual misunderstandings, but will confine my commentary
to footnotes. The view developed here is not among the six interpretations Flores can-
vasses.
6This paper is restricted to the special relativistic dynamics of (spinless) particles. One
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Section two presents the account of mass and energy implicit in most
textbook characterizations and some of the physical considerations motivat-
ing it. The central difficulty confronting this view is an apparent confusion
in treating mass and energy as having the same ontologically fundamental
status, a puzzle that has been discussed in Lange (2001, 2002) and is outlined
in section three. Lange’s own ‘perspectival’ account of the mass–energy re-
lationship is critiqued in sections four and five. In the process I raise several
overlooked interpretive puzzles for understanding relativistic dynamics. The
alternative ontology developed in section six takes the fundamental proper-
ties of particles to be encoded in geometrical features of their 4-momenta,
and in subsequent sections I use those properties to propose a new account
of what makes special relativity dynamically (as opposed to kinematically)
novel—an account on which there is no deep ontological connection between
energy and mass.
might feel that a clear understanding of energy–mass ‘equivalence’ can’t be adequately
addressed independently of general relativity or broader field-theoretic considerations.
See Lehmkuhl (2011, p.454, n.1) for an expression of this attitude. But there are good
reasons to think the energy–mass relationship can be investigated in an illuminating way
in the limited context of special relativistic particle dynamics, and in fact that such a
restricted context is the appropriate starting point for an inquiry into the relationship
between energy and mass. First, the original association of mass with energy, articulated
in Einstein (1905), draws solely upon special relativistic particle dynamics. There is thus
a straightforward conceptual question about how such an equivalence is to be understood
that predates any general relativistic or field-theoretic considerations. Einstein thought
the identification of mass and energy was already grounded in the comparatively simple
relativistic theory of point particle dynamics. Second, the philosophical challenges raised
to the received view discussed below resurface in the broader context of general relativity.
As noted by Hoefer (2000), the conceptual status of energy and mass is, if anything, more
problematic in that context. It is thus good philosophical methodology to start with
the simpler case in the hopes that a clear understanding of special relativistic particle
dynamics might point the way towards understanding more elaborate contexts. Whether
the interpretation developed here can be suitably extended to classical fields, including
general relativity, is an open question.
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2 The Received View
2.1 Mass as a Form of Energy
Traditional presentations of energy and mass in special relativity generally
proceed from the definition of the relativistic energy of a free particle:
E = γumc
2.
Here m is the particle’s mass, c is the speed of light, u is the particle’s speed,
and γu is the Lorentz factor given by
γu =
1√
1− u2/c2 .
In the relativistic context, unlike the classical one, a particle is evidently
recognized as possessing energy simply in virtue of possessing mass, for in
a frame in which a particle is stationary (u = 0) the relativistic energy
expression reduces to E0 = mc
2, where E0 is called the rest energy.
7 That
rest energy stands in a fixed ratio to mass has suggested to many physicists
that mass just is rest energy (sometimes suggestively called mass-energy).
For example, Taylor and Wheeler (1992) write that
[E0 = mc
2] is the most famous equation in all physics. Historically, the
factor c2 captured the public imagination because it witnessed to the
vast store of energy available in the conversion of even tiny amounts of
7Here ‘mass’ is being used in the modern sense of the property that determines how a
particle resists changes to its state of motion (see, e.g., Moore (2013, p.2)). Newton (1999)
famously thought of mass differently—as in some sense a measure of a body’s ‘quantity
of matter’. Jammer (1997) discusses the history of this conceptual transformation, which
has its origins in Euler’s work in the 18th century. For a philosophical justification of this
reconceptualization, see Cartwright (1975) and Lange (2001). The quantity represented
by m is sometimes misleadingly called a particle’s ‘rest mass’, although I follow Lange
(2001, 2002), Moore (2013), Rindler (1991), Wald (1984), and others in treating it as an
intrinsic, frame-independent property of a particle. That Flores (2005) fails to appreciate
this point leads to a misunderstanding—and misplaced criticism—of Lange’s view. (See
note 19 below.) Mass should be distinguished from a particle’s so-called ‘relativistic mass’,
given by mR = γum, for which rest mass is the special case corresponding to u = 0.
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mass to heat and radiation. The units of mc2 are joules; the units of m
are kilograms. However, we now recognize that joules and kilograms
are units different only because of historical accident. The conversion
factor c2, like the factor of conversion from seconds to meters or miles
to feet, can today be counted as a detail of convention rather than as
a deep new principle. (pp.203–206; diagrams on pp.204–205)
This understanding, which I take to be held by many physicists, holds that
mass and rest energy are “equivalent” in the sense that they are one and the
same physical property; their terms are coreferential. Given the intercon-
vertability between different forms of energy, one might also say that mass
is equivalent to energy in general, and that mass and kinetic (or potential)
energy are “two forms of the same thing”.8 Mass and energy are intercon-
vertible in the same sense that different forms of energy are interconvertible.
2.2 Mass Defects and Inelastic Collisions
But channeling Bondi and Spurgin (1987) in the passage above, we don’t
identify photon energy (E) and frequency (ν), even though they, too, are
related in fixed proportion as E = h¯ν, nor do we treat energy and frequency
as “two forms of the same thing”. So why interpret E0 = mc
2 differently?
Why not say that a certain amount of energy (E0) is ‘associated’ with an
object’s mass?
The central reason is that there seem to be physical processes in which
mass and other forms of energy are interconverted. One oft-cited illustration
concerns ‘mass defects’ associated with radioactive decay. When a tritium
(or hydrogen-3) nucleus decays in a nuclear fission reaction into a helium-3
nucleus, an electron, and a neutrino
3
1H → 32He1+ + e− + ν¯e,
8Sternheim and Kane (1991, p.493). See also Moore (2013, pp.34–35).
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the mass of the tritium is found to be greater than the sum of the masses
of the individual daughter bodies. Part of the mass of the tritium has
apparently been converted into the kinetic energies of the outgoing bodies,
for the loss of mass corresponds to a loss of rest energy determined by
∆E0 = ∆mc
2—precisely the amount needed to account for the increased
kinetic energy.
A second example concerns inelastic particle collisions. Consider a generic
inelastic collision between two particles of equal mass, as viewed from their
center-of-momentum frame:
Prior to collision, the mass and energy of the system are given by
msys = m1 +m2 = 2m
Esys = E1 + E2 = 2γumc
2.
Given energy conservation, the final system energy is now also given by
Esys = γu′Mc
2 = Mc2,
where u′ = 0 and γu′ = 1. Equating both expressions for system energy
2γumc
2 = Mc2
implies that
M = 2γum > 2m.
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Here mass appears to be gained in the collision process, and this gain is
accompanied by a corresponding loss in the system’s kinetic energy. Kinetic
energy has apparently been converted into mass, for the loss in kinetic energy
corresponds precisely to the gain in actual mass one would expect if mass
and rest energy were two forms of the same thing.9
3 The Problem of Lorentz Invariance
This widespread understanding of the energy–mass relationship has been
challenged by (Lange, 2001, 2002), who argues that the differing ontological
statuses of mass and energy in the theory undermines their alleged equiv-
alence. Lange’s argument is grounded in two related and widely-accepted
features of special relativity. First, that all inertial frames are physically
equivalent in the sense that the dynamical laws take the same form in all in-
ertial frames and, on their basis, do not permit the identification of any one
such frame as physically privileged or distinguished.10 Second, and relatedly,
that any numerical quantities representing primitive or basic physical prop-
erties are Lorentz-invariant—that is, are not frame- or observer-dependent.
(This is of course not to suggest that all fundamental physical properties
must be represented by scalar quantities.) Versions of both claims are also
generally taken to hold for classical dynamics, although in special relativity
9The kinetic energy (T ) of a free particle in special relativity is given by T = (γv −
1)mc2 so that E = γvmc
2 = E0 + T . In the inelastic collision, the kinetic energy lost is
2(γv − 1)mc2, which corresponds precisely to the rest energy (and hence mass) gained:
Mc2 − 2mc2 = 2γvmc2 − 2mc2 = 2(γv − 1)mc2.
10There are subtle issues concerning how to make precise sense of this notion of equiv-
alence and of the role of symmetries in theory interpretation in general, but that is a
topic for another paper. That the physical equivalence of all inertial frames lies at the
foundation of special relativity is explicit in Rindler (1991, pp.1,7,50), and Lange’s invo-
cation of the notion of Lorentz-invariance is standard in both the physics and philosophy
literatures.
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the class of such frame-dependent (and so non-fundamental) quantities is
larger and more counter-intuitive.11
Consider how these interpretive commitments get applied to discussions
of relativistic length and distance. As standardly understood, there is no
fundamental fact in special relativity about how long a measuring rod is,
as its length (as represented by a number) is not Lorentz-invariant. Its
value changes from one frame to the next in accordance with the Lorentz
transformations. There are facts about the length of the rod in different
frames—there is a perfectly real and objective physical fact about its length
in the inertial frame in which it’s at rest (its ‘rest length’), say, assuming
such a frame exists—but there is no frame-independent fact about the length
of the rod. Length is not an absolute property of the rod, and thus not a
candidate for being fundamental. None of this is to suggest that we ought
not to be interested in such derivative frame-dependent physical facts and
properties. Indeed, such features of the world are often the most readily
accessible and convenient with which to work, given the modes of description
that come naturally to us. But this is all the more reason why we must be
cautious in making judgments about the theory’s fundamental ontology.12
Failure to keep track of which individual quantities represent fundamen-
11Throughout this paper I make use of the distinction between a fundamental physical
property and a derivative or non-fundamental physical property. However those meta-
physical notions are made precise, it is this author’s opinion that the distinction is a
substantive one, and moreover one that is implicit in physical practice.
12The interpretive constraint that the mathematical objects and equations characteriz-
ing a theory’s fundamental ontology satisfy certain sorts of symmetry requirements—in
this case, requirements associated with Lorentz transformations—is not without its philo-
sophical puzzles. See, e.g., Dasgupta (2016) for a critical discussion of how such symmetry
demands might be justified. However, this paper is not intended as an exploration of this
issue, and I will take the overall cogency of this interpretive constraint for granted in what
follows. Were this interpretive principle to be jettisoned, it would have consequences
for the physical content of special relativity that go far beyond the relationship between
energy and mass.
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tal properties and which do not—of which individual quantities are Lorentz-
invariant and which are not—is the core of Lange’s argument against mass–
energy equivalence. For the mass of a particle is typically represented by
the Lorentz-invariant quantity m and is often interpreted as a fundamental
physical property, whereas its kinetic energy (γv − 1)mc2 and total free en-
ergy γvmc
2 are manifestly not Lorentz-invariant (depending as they both do
on frame-dependent speed) and thus not candidates for representing funda-
mental physical properties.13 How, then, are we to understand the alleged
physical conversion between mass and kinetic energy—a central motivation
for the received view—if one quantity in that conversion is fundamental and
the other is not? Indeed, in what sense could mass and kinetic energy be
“two forms of the same thing” if mass is a primitive physical property but
energy is not? On the face of it, the widely-publicized equivalence between
mass and energy appears to be the product of a ubiquitous conceptual con-
fusion. They simply cannot be equivalent (or interconvertible) because they
don’t share the same ontological category.14
One could simply insist that the quantity mc2 represents a distinct and
fundamental type of energy, but it’s unclear what the motivations for such
a view would be or why the resulting property would warrant the label ‘en-
ergy’. A defining feature of energy is its ability to be converted from one
form to another.15 What sense does it make to call mc2 ‘rest energy’ if it, but
not any other forms of energy, are fundamental physical properties—if we
13Of course something similar is also true in classical dynamics, as speed isn’t Galilean
invariant either, but in that context no one alleges an equivalence between mass and
energy.
14I interpret Lange’s characterization of mass as a “real property” to be that it is a
fundamental property. See Lange (2001, p.227). When indexed to a frame, energy is a
perfectly real physical property (just like speed). The issue is that it’s not fundamental.
15See Rindler (1991, p.74).
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can’t make physical sense of its conversion into other forms of energy? Al-
ternatively, one might jettison the idea that mass is a fundamental physical
property. Lange’s puzzle dissolves if both mass and energy are derivative
features of particles. However, in that case one is left wondering exactly
what the underlying particle ontology really is. If not in virtue of differ-
ing masses, what fundamentally accounts for the different dynamics (e.g.,
accelerations) of particles subject to identical impressed forces?16
4 Descriptive Conversion?
Lange’s solution is to deny the identification of mass as a form of energy on
the grounds that there are no genuine physical conversions between mass
and energy. Mass is no more a type of energy than photon frequency. The
impression of conversion that various physical processes elicit is, on this
view, an artifact of our choice of description—a feature of the perspective
that we adopt. In this sense, we convert energy to mass (or mass to energy),
not nature.
The diagnosis here hinges on the observation that mass in special rela-
tivity is non-additive: the mass of a system is generally not the sum of the
masses of its parts. Consider a system of eight particles of equal mass m,
each moving radially outward with the same speed u from a common origin.
This is depicted in the following diagram:
16Again, it’s worth emphasizing that Lange’s puzzle raises no concerns about the con-
sistency of E = γmc2 (or E0 = mc
2) within the mathematical formalism or about its use
in empirically successful applications. Rather, the issue here is a conceptual one about
how the theory’s ontology is to be understood.
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The frame represented in the diagram is the system’s rest frame. The sys-
tem’s total free energy in this frame, which is the sum of all eight constituent
particles’ energies, can thus be expressed as
Esys = Mc
2 = E1 + . . .+ E8.
But for each particle i, Ei = γumc
2, and so we can write
Mc2 = 8γumc
2,
from which we conclude:
M = 8γum > 8m.
Here of course there are no collisions or any other postulated interactions,
and thus no pretense of converting energy into mass. Instead, the lesson is
that the mass of the system is more than the sum of its constituent masses.
Re-expressing the system mass as17
M = (m1 + . . .+m8) +
1
c2
(T1 + . . .+ T8)
17See footnote 9.
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makes explicit how the system mass depends upon the kinetic energies of its
parts. Notice that if we were to boost each particle’s speed in equal measure,
u→ u′ > u, the mass of the system would increase:
E′sys = M
′c2 = 8γu′mc2
M ′ = 8γu′m > 8γum
because γu′ > γu, and yet the fundamental particle masses would remain
fixed.
This example might reasonably make us suspicious regarding claims of
mass–energy interconversion. The special relativistic formalism tells us that
the system mass goes up when the particles are uniformly boosted in their
respective directions, and thus it appears energy is being converted into
mass. Yet when we look at the particles themselves only their kinetic ener-
gies are changing. Their masses remain fixed, and so it looks like whatever
energy is applied to the system in the boost is converted into the kinetic
energies of the constituents. At no point does the mass of any electron in
this process change, for example, so in what sense is mass being gained or
lost?
To make sense of these and other apparent cases of mass–energy con-
version, Lange distinguishes two ways we might characterize a system of
particles. First, there is the ‘component level’ description. Here the col-
lection is described in terms of its constituent particles and the forces and
interactions they experience. Second, there is the ‘system level’ description,
where we think of the collection as a single unit interacting with an external
environment and ignore the internal dynamics. We shouldn’t be misled into
thinking each description is on an ontological par: the component level is
fundamental. While it is true that energy is apparently converted into mass
13
when a ball of gas is heated (to use Lange’s example), this ‘conversion’ only
occurs when the system-level description is invoked.18 Described entirely in
terms of basic constituents, Lange argues, there is no conversion between
mass and energy—just as there is no conversion in our initial example when
all eight particles are boosted. This is why he writes that mass–energy
conversion is an artifact of our perspective and not a real physical process.
Other cases involving particle systems mislead us into thinking that
energy–mass conversion occurs because we inadvertently switch perspectives
midway through our analysis. For instance, consider how Lange diagnoses
the typical textbook treatment of an inelastic collision. Recall from sec-
tion 2.2 that the kinetic energies of the pre-collision bodies appeared to be
converted into mass upon impact, as outlined in the diagram below:
But the total pre-collision mass is 2m only if we adopt a component-level
description. As one can see in the following diagram, on a system-level de-
scription (owing to non-additivity) the pre-collision mass is 2γvm—precisely
the mass of the system after collision:
18Bondi and Spurgin (1987) use this example to argue that energy has mass. Read in a
straightforward way, this claim is confused. Mass is a property of inertial resistance: the
mass of an object is a measure of how much that object resists changes to inertial motion
in light of impressed forces. So for energy to have mass, energy must be the sort of thing
to which impressed forces can be applied, and energy simply isn’t that sort of thing.
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The appearance of conversion from energy to mass in this instance arises
because textbooks switch descriptive levels halfway through the analysis.
If one describes the process from a fixed perspective, there is no conver-
sion. A similar diagnosis applies to the apparent mass defect involved in
tritium decay, although there the descriptive switch occurs in the opposite
direction: mass appears to be converted into energy because our pre-decay
description is at the system-level, whereas our post-decay description is at
the component level.19
19One worry with Lange’s account, raised by Flores (2005), is that the underlying onto-
logical picture arises from inconsistent application of the relevant interpretive principles.
Lange’s use of ‘mass’ to designate an object’s rest mass (Lange, 2001, p.225) appears to
implicitly privilege a particular frame—namely, the frame in which the object is (instan-
taneously) at rest. Like length, then, it is a perfectly real physical property, but on the
surface ought to be no more fundamental than particle mass in any other inertial frame—
which is to say, not fundamental. However, it is clear from Lange’s discussion of rest
mass and relativistic mass (Lange, 2001, pp.226–7) that rest mass is understood merely
as the u = 0 mathematical limit of relativistic mass. As previously noted (see note 7
above) the quantity m itself represents an ontologically fundamental and frame-invariant
particle property for Lange, which also happens to be equal to the particle’s relativistic
mass in the frame in which the particle is at rest. But that equality is not constitutive of
the property. In this way, contra Flores (2005), Lange’s proposed ontology preserves the
special relativistic maxim that all inertial frames are physically equivalent.
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5 Puzzles of Dynamical Interpretation
However, Lange’s diagnosis of alleged mass–energy conversions fails to con-
vince. In this section I explain why. In the process I identify several puzzles
we must confront in light of adhering to Lorentz invariance as an interpre-
tive constraint in understanding the fundamental ontology of special rela-
tivistic particle dynamics. These puzzles then help to motivate the account
of what makes special relativity dynamically novel that I develop in the fi-
nal sections—an account that makes no mention of any equivalence between
mass and energy.
5.1 Elementary Conversions
Assume for the moment that Lange has correctly diagnosed the alleged cases
of mass–energy conversion discussed above and that such conversions are, in
fact, unphysical. An initial problem is that his analysis doesn’t generalize.
There are a wide class of particle collisions where apparent energy–mass
conversion can’t be explained away as a perspectival shift. The most obvious
instances are electron–positron creation and annihilation:
γ + γ → e− + e+ (electron–positron creation)
e− + e+ → γ + γ (electron–positron annihilation)
In the first case, two high-energy massless photons collide to create an elec-
tron and a positron, both elementary particles of equal non-zero mass. In
the second, the reverse happens. In both instances there is an apparent con-
version between mass and energy that can’t be explained away by appealing
to different perspectives or levels of description. The pre-collision situation
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is characterized in terms of two distinct things, as is the post-collision situ-
ation. But in the creation reaction the input bodies have no mass, whereas
the output bodies do. Where has the mass come from? Certainly not from
switching our perspectives part way through the analysis. Some of the pho-
tons’ energy really has, it would seem, been converted into mass. Indeed,
the kinetic energy difference pre- and post-collision precisely matches the
energy associated, via ∆E0 = ∆mc
2, with the electron and positron masses.
Contra Lange (especially Lange (2001, p.230)), there is no plausible case to
be made here that mass alone is conserved. It is total energy that’s con-
served in this reaction, where that total energy would seem to include mass
as one particular form.
These examples are not isolated or unique. A host of particle reactions
can’t be accommodated within Lange’s analysis:
pi0 → γ + γ (neutral pion decay)
γ + p→ pi0 + p (pion photoproduction)
p+ p→ p+ p+ p+ p¯ (proton–antiproton pair production)20
e− + e+ → e− + e+ + e− + e+ (electron–positron pair production)
In each, the apparent conversion between energy and mass occurs at the
fundamental descriptive level, so no plausible story about shifting perspec-
tives is available. These reactions really do seem to involve mass coming
into and out of existence.
Unfortunately, the existence of these reactions does little to quell the
original sense of puzzlement. In the particle reactions it seems hard to
deny that mass is created and destroyed, and mass–energy conversion in
20This terminology follows Freund (2008, p.247).
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accordance with ∆E0 = ∆mc
2 is the natural explanation. But how is such
a story conceptually coherent if mass is a fundamental physical property
and energy (being Lorentz-variant) is not?
Here we must be careful to manage expectations and to distinguish two
issues. There is, on the one hand, the physical account of what’s going on
in these reactions and why they occur. What physical laws govern electron-
positron annihilation and creation, for example? We should not expect
special relativity (or at least special relativistic particle dynamics) to answer
this question. The collision reactions at issue are inherently quantum in
nature and our best understanding of them lies in quantum field theory, not
in the non-quantum particle dynamics of special relativity.
On the other hand, quantum field theory is designed to preserve cen-
tral conceptual and dynamical features of special relativity, such as the
physical equivalence of all Lorentz frames, and the collision reactions noted
in this section are often cited in support of the purely special relativistic
identification of mass with energy.21 Is there a way of understanding the
fundamental ontology of special relativistic particle dynamics that remains
consistent with—even if not explanatory of —the existence of these colli-
sion reactions, without thereby either committing the conceptual error of
identifying fundamental and derivative physical properties or giving up the
principle that all inertial frames are physically equivalent? That seems like
an entirely reasonable question. What Lange’s puzzle makes vivid is that
standard textbook accounts, according to which there is simply a conversion
between mass and energy, fail to provide this.
21Many of the core classical principles of relativistic particle dynamics are strikingly well-
confirmed by the very reactions at issue. See French (1968) for a discussion of some of the
experimental evidence from particle physics for the basic principles of special relativistic
particle dynamics.
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5.2 Composite Mass
Let us back up a step: is Lange’s analysis adequate for the cases he considers
explicitly? Return to his diagnosis of the ball of gas and recall that, when the
gas is heated, there is an apparent conversion of energy into mass. Lange’s
claim is that this conversion is unphysical and the product of a particular
perspectival switch, namely, from that of treating the ball of gas as composed
of distinct molecules to that of treating the ball of gas as a single unit. When
the gas is viewed from the more ontologically fundamental perspective—that
of the gas molecules themselves—the application of heat merely changes
the kinetic energies and not the molecular masses. On this basis, Lange
concludes that “this ‘conversion’ of energy into mass is not any kind of real
physical process taking place in nature. We ‘converted’ energy into mass
simply by changing our perspectives on the gas: from treating it as many
bodies to treating it as a single body” (Lange, 2001, p.235).
This diagnosis only makes the situation of the gas more mysterious, how-
ever, for there is a genuine and fundamental physical process occurring here
in need of identification. If we imagine the gas (as a system) to be uniformly
distributed in an enclosing box or shell, that box will be harder to move—will
exhibit more inertial resistance to impressed forces—after it’s been heated.
This is a real empirical effect, not a magician’s conjuring trick!22 There is
an undeniable physical change in the gas’ total mass after heating, and that
change must be grounded in changes to the fundamental properties of the
basic entities constituting the gas. That is, there is a genuine physical fact
about the inertial resistance the gas puts up—a fact that is grounded in
22See Bondi and Spurgin (1987). This point is also noted in Flores (2005). A similar
phenomena occurs in a compressed spring, which has a larger mass than a relaxed spring
owing (it would seem) to its increased potential energy. On this point, see Dib (2013).
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the fundamental properties of the gas’ basic constituents—and thus a gen-
uine physical fact about whether that mass is changing. It is! That the gas’
mass (as a system) can change while the masses of its molecular constituents
remain constant is in fact precisely what non-additivity shows.
Therein lies the real mystery, the one that Lange’s analysis obscures. A
physical change in the gas’ mass is clearly occurring and that change must be
grounded in changes to the fundamental properties of the gas’ elementary
constituents. But how can that be if kinetic energy isn’t a fundamental
physical property and if the kinetic energies of the constituent molecules
are the salient things changing? If energy is not being converted into mass,
what exactly is happening? (Put another way, how do we make sense of this
process as a genuinely physical one in light of non-additivity?)23
Turn now to Lange’s analysis of inelastic collisions. The charge was
that in the process of describing the collision we inadvertently switched
perspectives, and in the process ‘converted’ the kinetic energy of the initial
bodies into the rest mass of the final body. If we think of the two pre-collision
bodies as a single system, the total system mass will equal the mass of the
single body post-collision and the alleged conversion evaporates. Again (the
claim is) the conversion is revealed to be unphysical, the result of descriptive
legerdemain.
But for this analysis to be compelling, Lange must do more than show
that the mass of the pre-collision two-body arrangement, when viewed as a
single system, is the same as the mass of the post-collision body. He must (in
23This puzzle—the puzzle of understanding the nature of composite mass—is not unique
to macroscopic objects or objects whose constituents only interact via collisions (as one
generally assumes for gases). For all but the most fundamental particles, mass seems to
be partly constituted by ‘internal’ energy, whether in the form of kinetic energy or some
form of binding or potential energy.
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the first instance) establish that such descriptions amount to characterizing
the pre- and post-collision arrangements from the same perspective, and
that requires saying a good deal more about how exactly these ‘perspectival
descriptions’ are to be understood. What justifies Lange’s claim that the
textbook analysis switches perspectives? That we view the pre-collision
arrangement as two bodies and the post-collision arrangement as one? Am
I switching perspectives when I smash a rock and describe the result as a
collection of shards?
More importantly, though, Lange’s diagnosis fails in this case for the
same reason it did for the ball of gas. There is a genuine physical process
occurring here in which mass is changing—a process that is grounded in
changes to the fundamental properties of the particles that constitute the
colliding bodies. Imagine that two equally massive balls of putty collide in
an inelastic collision. If I then cut the post-collision body in half, each will
have a greater mass than either pre-collision body. This is a real physical
change and Lange’s talk of ‘switching perspectives’ obscures it. The obvious
explanation of this change is that the kinetic energies of the putty molecules
have increased, but now we’re back at non-additivity and the ball of gas
puzzle.
6 An Ontology for Relativistic Particle Dynamics
The situation we now face is the following: there are compelling grounds
to deny the inter-convertibility and equivalence of mass and energy, and
yet such a denial seems hard to reconcile with important experimental phe-
nomena. What should we make of this? I suggest that the difficulties
stem from an inadequate (or inadequately specified) ontological picture of
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special relativity and from a hitherto overlooked feature of its dynamical
foundations. Accordingly, this section develops a new account of the fun-
damental ontology of special relativistic particle dynamics. This requires
identifying the metaphysically basic entities and properties, indicating how
they interact and evolve dynamically, and specifying the mathematical ob-
jects and structures and equations that encode that physical picture.24 The
ontology is based on a generally covariant (or geometrical) formulation of
special relativity, briefly outlined in the first subsection. Several indepen-
dent motivations for my ontological picture are offered, although the cen-
tral claim—developed in sections 7 through 9—is that this interpretation
provides a satisfying resolution of the puzzles associated with mass–energy
‘equivalence’ while clarifying the dynamical foundations of special relativity
and the meaning of E0 = mc
2.
It is now commonplace to formulate special relativity in 4-dimensional
terms, so one might not think this section has anything new to offer.25 But:
(1) this formulation is rarely accompanied by any discussion of the funda-
mental ontological picture associated with the dynamics; (2) there has been
no discussion in the literature of how the experimental phenomena associated
with alleged energy-mass conversion ought to be understood in geometrical
terms; and, most importantly for foundational concerns, (3) despite the
ubiquity of 4-dimensional presentations, it has yet to be recognized—as I
think it ought to be—that the central dynamical insight of special relativity
has nothing to do with the relationship between energy and mass. Indeed,
4-dimensional expositions of special relativity remain frustratingly elusive
24The approach here is in the spirit of Maudlin (2018).
25Standard philosophical references include Friedman (1983), Earman (1989), and Mala-
ment (2012).
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regarding what the central dynamical (as opposed to kinematical) insights
really are.
6.1 The Dynamical Formalism on Minkowski Spacetime
Geometrically, special relativistic theories are framed against the backdrop
of Minkowski spacetime, which is a space of events represented by a 4-
dimensional (pseudo-Riemannian) manifold equipped with a flat metric ηµν
of (Lorentzian) signature (−,+,+,+).26 The trajectory or worldline of a
material particle is the collection of events that together constitute the his-
tory of that body, and it is a basic postulate of special relativity that such
objects are represented by timelike worldlines and light rays by null trajec-
tories.27
Each point along a particle’s worldline is associated with a unique 4-
26Where there is little risk of confusion I will be lax about the distinction between
mathematical representation and physical feature represented.
27Recall that the metric structure divides the spacetime at any point (call it the ‘origin
point’) into distinct regions, which can be characterized by the vectors (4-vectors) at that
point. The timelike region consists of those events whose displacement vectors from the
origin point have negative magnitude. All such events are said to be timelike separated
from the origin point and any 4-vector that points from the origin point to a timelike
separated event is said to be a timelike 4-vector. The lightlike (spacelike) region is the
set of events whose displacement 4-vectors from the origin point are of null (positive)
magnitude. This definition extends to 4-vectors as above. A curve through the manifold
is said to be timelike (null, spacelike) if the tangent 4-vector at each point along it is
timelike (null, spacelike).
Note that photons play a rather curious role in textbook presentations of special relativ-
ity, with some authors smoothly sliding between initial talk of light rays or signals to later
talk of photons and other authors acknowledging that photons are quantum mechanical
in nature and thus not a part of special relativistic dynamics proper. (Compare Rindler
(1991, pp.84–86) and Faraoni (2013, p.173).) The latter view is how special relativity was
originally understood: in the 1920s, well after the acceptance of special relativity, Bohr
and others continued to express doubts about the existence of photons. See, e.g., Pais
(1991, pp.230ff) and Murdoch (1990, pp.19ff). The presentation here is deliberately silent
on the behavior of photons in Minkowski spacetime. Indeed, as Rindler (1991, p.8) notes,
light itself is not essential to the spacetime structure of special relativity. Maudlin (2012,
Ch.4) makes a related claim, developing the kinematics in a way that makes no mention
either of inertial frames or of light’s constitution and ‘speed’.
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vector Pµ called the 4-momentum (or energy-momentum 4-vector), which
is always tangent to the curve and is traditionally defined in textbooks as
Pµ = mUµ,
where
Uµ =
dxµ
dτ
is the 4-velocity along the worldline.28 τ is the proper time parameter along
the particle’s worldline. In an arbitrary inertial frame the 4-momentum can
be expressed in coordinate form as:
Pµ = (γumc, γumu) = (E/c,p),
where u = dxdt is the spatial velocity in that frame, E = γumc
2 is the
relativistic energy of the particle, and p = γumu is its relativistic spatial
momentum (or relativistic 3-momentum). These features are illustrated in
the following spacetime diagram:
[Text]
E/m
[T
p
μ
 
28Some authors use bolded capital letters (e.g., A) for 4-vectors and bolded lower-case
letters (e.g., a) for spatial 3-vectors, indicating the components in an inertial frame S by
writing A
S→ (A0, A1, A2, A3) or a S→ (a1, a2, a3). I will occasionally use this notation,
but more often will refer to 4-vectors by writing things like Aµ, understood to represent
the components of the 4-vector A in some arbitrary inertial frame.
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Here it’s worth emphasizing that both relativistic energy and mass show up
as components in the frame-dependent decomposition of the 4-momentum,
so we might expect there to be some connection between 4-momentum and
a clear understanding of the relationship between energy and mass.
There are several dynamical principles governing special relativistic par-
ticles. First, in response to a 4-force Fµ a particle obeys what appears to
be a 4-dimensional relativistic analogue of Newton’s equation of motion:
Fµ =
dPµ
dτ
.
The components of the 4-force in an arbitrary inertial frame are given by
Fµ = γu(c
d
dt
[γum],
dp
dt
) = γu(
1
c
dE
dt
, f).
Here f is the relativistic 3-force
f =
dp
dt
=
d(γumu)
dt
,
which in the u/c → 0 limit reduces to what one might classically identify
as the Newtonian force. Second, the total 4-momentum of a set of colliding
particles, Ptot, is always conserved:
Ptot =
n∑
i=1
P(i) = constant,
where the P(i) are the 4-momenta of the incoming (or outgoing) particles.
This is an independent dynamical principle and not something derived from
a more basic law. Let us call it the 4-Momentum Collision Principle.29
Together, I will argue, these two dynamical principles—when coupled with
29See Rindler (1991, pp.70–73, 90–92). For an isolated n-body system that interacts
only locally (i.e., effectively via collisions), a more general principle holds that the net
4-momentum of the system remains constant, in the sense that the components of the
total system 4-momentum do not change in any given inertial frame. Even though the
specific P(i) 4-vectors that are elements of this sum are frame-dependent because the
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the right interpretation of the theory’s fundamental ontology—clarify the
physical significance of E0 = mc
2 and suggest an alternative picture of what
makes special relativity dynamically novel.30
6.2 Outline of a New Ontology
What metaphysics ought to be associated with this formalism? Standard
presentations of classical dynamics encourage a particular ontological pic-
ture, according to which there are (a) material particles possessing primitive
properties of mass and instantaneous location and velocity in space or space-
time, and (b) forces that mediate interactions between particles and generate
changes in their dynamical states and motions.31 Other quantities of physi-
cal significance—e.g., “dynamical variables” like spatial momentum, angular
momentum, and energy—are ultimately understood as derivative properties
grounded in, or defined in terms of, what’s ontologically fundamental.32
summation is taken at an instant, in these circumstances Rindler (1991, pp.78–79) shows
that the total system 4-momentum Psys is a well-defined 4-vector. It follows from this
more general principle that relativistic energy and relativistic (spatial) momentum are
both independently conserved in these circumstances, even though the values of those
quantities are frame-dependent. For a more general discussion not restricted to inertial
observers, see Gourgoulhon (2010, pp.288–291). When an n-body system can’t be treated
as isolated, such as when various sorts of field-theoretic considerations are included, then
there isn’t generally a well-defined total 4-momentum associated with the system. How-
ever, the puzzles developed above concern physical systems for which these field-theoretic
considerations can be ignored. Recall (see footnote 6) that the guiding methodology here
is to tease out the significance of E0 = mc
2 in the simplest dynamical cases and to leave
more complicated physical situations for subsequent work.
30There is a third dynamical principle—conservation of the angular momentum 4-tensor
along any particle’s world line—but it won’t play a role in the argument that follows.
31Roughly speaking, a dynamical state of a particle is the collection of fundamental
properties relevant to the types of interactions it generates and the way in which it responds
to different types of interactions. A particle may possess properties that are relevant to
whether it experiences a particular impressed force or interaction, but which are not part
of its dynamical state—e.g., its position in space or spacetime. A non-interacting object
moving inertially is constantly changing its position and yet its dynamical state remains
constant.
32See, e.g., Jose´ and Saletan (1998, pp.13–14). I do not mean to suggest that this
picture of classical ontology is uncontroversial. Among the issues raised in recent years,
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On the other hand, while typical presentations of special relativity of-
ten contain extensive discussions of the radical ontological changes brought
about by relativistic kinematics (e.g., the relativity of simultaneity, length
contraction, time dilation), they remain surprisingly quiet regarding any
ontological changes demanded by the new dynamics—aside, as we’ve seen,
from problematic claims about the equivalence of mass and energy. Indeed,
the very manner in which the new dynamics is often introduced as “a mod-
ification of the Newtonian scheme” and the similarity in terminology gives
the impression that much of the ontology standardly associated with classi-
cal dynamics carries over, more or less, to the context of special relativistic
particle dynamics.33 We are told, for example, that classical momentum
(pcl = mu) must be ‘redefined’ in the relativistic context and that the
equation f = dpdt is the ‘relativistic generalization’ of Newton’s second law.
Many relativistic expressions appear as seemingly straightforward analogues
of Newtonian ones, thereby suggesting that the basic ontology underpinning
the dynamics remains essentially the same.34
This impression strikes me as profoundly mistaken. Relativistic particle
dynamics requires a radically different fundamental ontology from the one
some philosophers have considered whether velocity ought to be taken as an ontologically
primitive property in its own right (see Arntzenius (2000), Carroll (2002), Meyer (2003),
Smith (2003), Lange (2005), Easwaran (2014), McCoy (2018)), whereas others have won-
dered whether attributions of mass ought to designate fundamental properties of particles
(see Dasgupta (2013), Martens (forthcomingb), Martens (forthcominga)). And Butter-
field (2006) has argued against understanding classical dynamics (or indeed any physical
theory) in terms of properties defined at points of space or spacetime. There is also a
long tradition within the metaphysics of physics going back at least to Mach and Hertz
puzzling over just what sort of thing a force really is. For more recent discussion, see, e.g.,
Ellis (1976), Bigelow et al. (1988), and Wilson (2007). Some of the issues raised in these
literatures will be relevant to the specific way I frame the ontological proposal sketched
below, but they do not affect the central argument and in the context of this paper I’ve
had to set them aside.
33French (1968, p.4)
34See, e.g., French (1968, pp.21–23).
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usually associated with classical dynamics—one that goes well beyond dif-
ferences associated with kinematics. I think the correct ontology is based on
the 4-dimensional covariant formulation of the dynamics, and that the fail-
ure to realize this (or at least to articulate clearly that ontology) obscures
the solution to Lange’s puzzle and the novel foundational features of the
dynamics itself.
6.2.1 Dynamical States of Particles
If we take the geometrical formulation of special relativity seriously and
understand the dynamics as genuinely unfolding in Minkowski spacetime,
the 4-momentum vector is the obvious candidate for encoding a particle’s
instantaneous dynamical state. There is a natural ontology associated with
this, according to which the 4-momentum encodes two distinct and fun-
damental properties of a particle: one represented by the 4-momentum’s
magnitude and the other represented by what I will call the 4-momentum’s
orientation. (This is not to deny that 4-momentum components represent
objectively real particle properties when indexed to a particular frame, but
those features are not fundamental.) For material bodies, whose worldlines
are timelike, these properties are physically independent. So the proposal
is that, at any given location in spacetime at which a massive particle ex-
ists, this pair collectively defines the instantaneous dynamical state of that
particle at that location.
As ontologically primitive features of particles, these properties are not
subject to reductive analysis or further explication, although one can still
convey a feel for their physical content. The magnitude of a particle’s 4-
momentum is in some sense a reflection of how much the particle resists
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changes to its dynamical state on account of an applied 4-force. This quan-
tity is often taken to be just another way of representing particle mass, an
impression reinforced by the fact that ‖Pµ‖ = √−PµPµ = mc holds as a
fixed relation for all material particles. I have no objection to this concep-
tual gloss on the physical content of 4-momentum magnitude, but in keeping
with my emphasis on the covariant formalism I prefer to think of Pµ as the
central representational device: the customary definition of 4-momentum,
Pµ = mUµ, is, on this view, a definition of the quantity m.35 Pµ directly
represents two basic dynamical properties of particles and is not to be under-
stood as representing derivative features characterized by constellations of
mathematical objects that themselves represent more fundamental physical
properties.
The second primitive property, 4-momentum orientation, reflects roughly
35There is some precedent in the physics literature for thinking of m this way. See,
e.g., Gourgoulhon (2010, p.272). I do not think anything of deep philosophical substance
hangs on this point: both ‖Pµ‖ and m are understood as representing one and the same
primitive physical property. However, within the special relativistic formalism the quantity
m is most salient in frame-dependent contexts, where it plays a central role in dynamical
equations governing derivative ontology. Since I think the focus on the frame-dependent
equations for special relativistic particle dynamics has been the source of much ontological
confusion, I prefer to do without m and use ‖Pµ‖ as the representation of particle mass.
It’s worth emphasizing that the property represented by m (or ‖Pµ‖) takes on a rather
different character in relativistic dynamics than it does in classical dynamics. Within
an inertial frame a special relativistic particle, unlike a classical one, exhibits different
amounts of inertial resistance to impressed 3-forces in different directions. The resistance
to being accelerated in a direction parallel to a particle’s instantaneous spatial velocity—
its ‘longitudinal mass’—is different from its resistance to being accelerated in a direction
perpendicular to its instantaneous spatial velocity—its ‘transverse mass’. Indeed, the
spatial acceleration of a body in response to an impressed 3-force is generally not even
in the direction of the 3-force itself. The frame-dependent dynamical equation governing
particle motion is f = γuma+
d
dt
[γum]u, and so the magnitude and direction of a particle’s
acceleration in response to an impressed force depends on properties other than just m
and the direction in which the force is applied (e.g., its spatial velocity in a frame). The
relationship f = ma holds only in the instantaneous rest frame of the particle. Freund
(2008, pp.195–198) describes a very simple example where a constant 3-force applied to
a particle solely in the x-direction generates a velocity-dependent deceleration in the y-
direction.
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how a particle is ‘directed in’ spacetime.36 Together, we can think of 4-
momentum magnitude and orientation as reflecting how a particle is ‘mov-
ing through’ spacetime. Although spacetime diagrams may suggest that
orientation is an artifact of one’s choice of coordinates, it is in fact only our
representation that is coordinate-dependent. The orientation itself, in space-
time, is entirely independent of any coordinate system.37 This is of course
not the only respect in which spacetime diagrams of Minkowski spacetime
can mislead. The following two diagrams are equally adequate graphical rep-
resentations of the same 4-momentum (same magnitude, same orientation),
just drawn from the perspective of different Lorentz frames:
ct
x
and
36Like ‖Pµ‖ and m, Pµ and Uµ are equally good representations of a particle’s (4-
momentum) orientation.
37This sort of discourse naturally suggests an underlying substantivalism of some form
or other. I embrace this, but wish to remain agnostic here regarding whether such a
metaphysical commitment is necessary for the ontology I propose.
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ct'
x'
On the other hand, the two 4-momenta in the following diagram have the
same magnitude but different orientations, as they are being represented
with respect to the same Lorentz frame:
ct
x
We cannot specify the 4-momentum orientation of a particle except by in-
voking indexical expressions—say, by specifying a coordinate system using
indexicals and then giving the 4-momentum components in that coordinate
system—much as the proponent of substantival space can’t specify the ab-
solute location of a particle except by saying (pointing) that it is here or
there or providing its coordinates in some coordinate system.38 But that
38For more on the role of indexicals in this sort of context, see Maudlin (1993,
pp.189–191). There are, of course, easily expressible facts about relative differences in
4-momentum orientations between particles, as P1 · P2 = ‖P1‖‖P2‖γ(v) holds invari-
antly (where v is the relative velocity between the two particles). See Rindler (1991,
p.76). If P1 · P2 = ‖P1‖‖P2‖ then both 4-momenta have the same orientation, and if
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alone is not a reason to reject it, especially if its inclusion in the ontology
can be given a compelling theoretical justification.
By way of such a theoretical justification, consider a particle moving iner-
tially that is suddenly, for a temporal interval ∆t as measured in a particular
Lorentz frame, subjected to a constant impressed 3-force in the direction of
its motion. During this interval the particle accelerates, and then returns
to inertial motion after the force is switched off. Intuitively, the dynami-
cal state of the particle has changed: the particle’s state before the applied
force is switched on is different from its state after the force is switched off.
After all, if there were a second (force-free) particle originally at rest with
respect to the first, after ∆t it would be in uniform relative motion with
respect to it (or in a different state of relative motion if the second particle
wasn’t originally at rest). But what about the dynamical state of the parti-
cle itself has changed? What fundamental physical properties does it have
that we can point to as having changed from one side of this interval to the
other? All of the obvious candidates—kinetic energy, speed, 3-momentum
magnitude—aren’t Lorentz-invariant and thus aren’t fundamental, and the
orientation of its 3-momentum remains unchanged because the force is ap-
plied in the direction of motion. The dynamical state of the particle has
changed, but when considered within a frame it’s not at all clear exactly
which fundamental properties have changed.39
Other situations illustrate the same point. Consider a world consisting
of two otherwise identical particles moving in the same direction at different
P1 ·P2 6= ‖P1‖‖P2‖ then the extent to which P1 ·P2/‖P1‖‖P2‖ > 1 provides a measure
of how their orientations differ.
39It’s of course true that the magnitude of the particle’s acceleration is non-zero during
the interval ∆t—and, being Lorentz-invariant, this points to a genuine physical differ-
ence while the force is being applied—although, unlike Newtonian dynamics, in special
relativity the non-zero magnitude of that acceleration is frame-dependent.
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speeds relative to some inertial frame. Again, these particles occupy different
dynamical states and thus possess different fundamental physical properties.
If each were to collide with the same object, they would react differently.
The 3-forces exerted in those collisions would be different. But it’s not at all
clear which properties to identify as accounting for their differing dynamical
states, as the obvious candidates (noted above) either aren’t fundamental or
are shared between the particles. Again, what we’d like is some account of
how these particles or states differ that only appeals to fundamental physical
properties.40
The postulation of a fundamental property of 4-momentum orientation
provides an immediate and satisfying diagnosis of these situations. In the
case of a particle subjected to a 3-force for a finite interval, the orienta-
tion of the particle’s 4-momentum does change. The orientations before
and after the application of the force are distinct. Indeed, part of what
the relativistic force law says is that the dynamical effect of an interaction
can be to change the 4-momentum orientation of a particle. Because I take
4-momentum orientation to be a fundamental physical property that partly
defines a particle’s dynamical state, changes in orientation provide an imme-
diate explanation of how the dynamical state of the particle changes across
∆t. In fact, it is the only fundamental dynamical difference.41 Similarly,
40In this instance we can see particularly clearly how the same issue arises for Newtonian
dynamics, as the standard properties one might be inclined to appeal to aren’t Galilean-
invariant either and thus aren’t candidates for being fundamental properties within the
context of Newtonian theory (or don’t differ between the particles). The motivations devel-
oped here thus apply equally to an analogous ontological picture of classical dynamics—
although in that context there is no puzzle associated with energy and mass that the
ontology helps to resolve.
41Clearly, such changes in orientation are also associated with several coordinate-
dependent effects, including changes in momentum and kinetic energy. This is how the
3-force component of a 4-force gives rise to frame-dependent changes in velocity and kinetic
energy.
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what distinguishes the dynamical states of otherwise identical particles pos-
sessing different kinetic energies is that their 4-momenta point in different
directions of spacetime, even though they might be moving in the same spa-
tial direction. The ability to explain these distinctions is obscured if we look
only within a frame, for a primitive notion of 4-momentum orientation is
only a salient metaphysical option from a geometrical spacetime perspective.
6.2.2 Interactions in Spacetime
This is not the complete ontology. Turning to the dynamics of particle in-
teractions, 4-forces themselves on this picture are fundamental, not 3-forces.
Relativistic 3-forces are generally introduced as the analogues of Newtonian
forces, so there’s a temptation to assign them the same ontological status
within each theory. But as has been emphasized throughout this paper, one
principle reflected in special relativity is that all inertial frames are physi-
cally equivalent. A relativistic 3-force, as part of the spatial component of
a 4-force, simply does not transform in a Lorentz-covariant way. Rather, 3-
forces transform on the model of ordinary spatial velocity.42 Letting S and
S′ be two inertial frames in standard configuration, v the speed of S′ relative
to S (along the x-axis), u
S→ (u1, u2, u3) = (dxdt , dydt , dzdt ) the spatial velocity of
a particle p in frame S, and f
S→ (f1, f2, f3) the S-components of the relevant
3-force applied to p, the components of the 3-force f ′ experienced by p in S′
are given via the following transformations:
f ′1 =
f1 − v d(γum)dt
(1− u1v
c2
)
f ′2 =
f2
γv(1− u1vc2 )
42See Rindler (1991, p.91) for discussion.
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f ′3 =
f3
γv(1− u1vc2 )
.
The transformation depends upon both the relative velocity between frames
and (surprisingly) the velocity of the particle itself on which the force is act-
ing. It is evident from these transformations that boosting from one frame
to the next changes both the magnitude of the 3-force p experiences and the
angular difference between it and p’s 3-velocity u. That is, if p experiences
a particular 3-force applied in a specific direction in a given frame S, the
applied 3-force in a boosted frame S′ will generally have both a different
magnitude and a different direction.43 There is no frame-independent fact
about what 3-force is acting on a particle at any given event, and thus 3-
forces are not the sorts of posits that ought to be taken as ontologically
fundamental. (At least, one cannot take the 3-force as ontologically fun-
damental without privileging some particular inertial frame.) Indeed, there
are situations in which a particle experiences no impressed 3-force in its
rest frame but a non-zero 3-force in all other frames, each parallel to the
direction in which the frame is boosted relative to the rest frame.44
Instead, I propose that we understand interactions between particles
by taking 4-forces as (or as representing something) fundamental. This
is a natural proposal given the formal connection between 4-forces and 4-
momenta changes and the fact that 4-momenta are here taken to encode
the instantaneous dynamical states of particles. As with spatial forces in
Newton’s physics, 4-forces on this view are the fundamental things mediating
interactions between particles and changing their dynamical states.
Like 4-momenta, 4-forces possess magnitudes and orientations in space-
43Only when the force is ‘pure’ (discussed below) and the boost is in the direction of u
will it be the case that f = f ′. See Rindler (1991, p.91) for discussion.
44Rindler (1991, p.92) calls such forces ‘heatlike’.
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time. We can think of 4-forces as pushes and pulls through spacetime.
Whereas the push or pull of a Newtonian force tries to change the way
a body is moving through space, a 4-force tries to change the way a body
is moving through spacetime.45 That spacetime isn’t isotropic means that
the character of the push or pull exhibits itself in different ways depending
on: the orientation of the 4-force; the orientation of the 4-momentum of the
particle to which it’s applied; and the frame in which it’s being considered.
For example, a 4-force applied orthogonally to a particle’s 4-momentum and
considered in the rest frame of the particle will manifest itself as a purely
spatial push. In other frames it will also involve a ‘temporal push’, in each
case rotating the orientation of the particle’s 4-momentum.
In summary, then, the fundamental ontology I postulate for special rel-
ativistic particle dynamics is one according to which there are two types
of basic entities, particles and 4-forces, each of which possess two distinct
fundamental properties—one represented by a scalar magnitude and one as-
sociated with an orientation in spacetime. (This is in addition to Minkowski
spacetime and any properties that might come along with that.) Many of the
entities and properties we typically associate with the dynamics of particles
in special relativity are, on the proposal here, not fundamental.
7 The Geometry of Composite Mass
Returning to the puzzle of composite mass, recall that the issue there was
that there seemed to be a variety of cases in which a physical process was
occurring in a system even though none of the fundamental properties of
the system’s constituents seemed to be changing. I agree with Lange that
45This view of Newtonian forces as pushes and pulls is emphasized in Wilson (2007).
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no physical conversion occurs between mass and energy when, say, a gas
is heated, and yet a real physical process is occurring that is changing the
system’s mass. If the gas were enclosed in a box, it would be harder to
move after being heated. What we would like is an explanation of how the
mass of the system is constituted by fundamental physical properties of its
underlying constituents—properties that are changing as the gas is heated.
The trick is to recognize that velocity-dependent quantities are not the
only features of the molecules that are changing in this process. Even if
the magnitudes of the 4-momenta remain constant, the orientations of the
4-momenta are changing in response to whatever 4-forces are transmitting
the heat. On the ontology advocated here, these are fundamental physical
changes to the dynamical states of the constituent molecules. Recognizing
that the 4-momentum of the total system is just the ordinary vector sum
in Minkowski spacetime of its constituent 4-momenta, it follows that these
changes in 4-momenta orientations at the constituent level give rise to the
changing mass of the gas as a whole.46 To see this, let’s start with the
diagram below for the (much simplified) case of a 2-body system:
ct
x
For any gas, of course, there are vastly more component 4-momentum vec-
46As noted in footnote 29, the situation is more complicated for systems whose physical
descriptions require field-theoretical considerations, for in those cases there isn’t generally
a well-defined total 4-momentum that can be associated with the system.
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tors, although they too add up to just a single net 4-momentum for the
system. Notice that the magnitude of the net 4-momentum (in red) clearly
depends on both the magnitudes and the orientations of the constituent’s
4-momenta.
Consider now what happens as the system is heated, as the orientations
of the constituent 4-momenta change but not their magnitudes (masses).
Due to the geometry of Minkowski spacetime all such equal-magnitude 4-
vectors have endpoints that lie along the hyperbola shown in the following
diagram:
ct
x
The hyperbola itself is Lorentz invariant, although the inclinations at which
the 4-vectors are drawn is frame-dependent. Here, the new 4-momenta (the
solid vectors) are drawn in the original rest frame of the system. Notice
that the 4-momentum of the system does not remain constant during the
heating process. It retains its orientation in spacetime as the orientations of
its constituent 4-momenta change, but—unlike its constituents—its magni-
tude also changes. As the constituent particles move faster in the original
frame—as their 4-momenta rotate their orientations—the magnitude of the
system’s 4-momentum gets larger. So not only can the composite mass of
the system be understood as constituted by fundamental physical proper-
ties of its molecular constituents (namely, the physical properties encoded in
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the constituents’ 4-momentum vectors) but we can understand what genuine
physical changes are occurring at the molecular level when the gas is heated
that result in changing the mass of the gas as a whole. Unlike changes in
velocity and kinetic energy, these are fundamental physical changes, and as
such provide a solution to the original puzzle of composite mass.
Although Lange is right that the mass of an n-body system can be ex-
pressed as
M = (m1 + . . .+mn) +
1
c2
(T1 + . . .+ Tn),
the dependence of system mass on constituent energies is a coordinate-
dependent manifestation of the more fundamental dependence of system
mass on 4-momenta magnitudes and orientations. Lange’s expression is an
artifact of how the magnitude of the system’s total 4-momentum decomposes
into its constituents’ 4-momentum components in the center-of-momentum
frame. It does not reflect the genuine physical properties that actually de-
termine the mass of the gas. Those are the constituent 4-momentum mag-
nitudes and orientations, a fact which (again) is obscured unless one adopts
the 4-dimensional ontology of particle dynamics proposed here.
8 Inellastic Collisions at the Level of ‘Principle’
Turning to inelastic collisions, the 4-Momentum Collision Principle tells us
how the total 4-momentum of an isolated system constrains the way in which
the 4-momenta magnitudes and orientations of its constituents change when
they undergo collision. Initially (i.e., pre-collision), the net 4-momenta of
each ball are oriented in different directions, and that’s why the two collid-
ing bodies have a total mass that is more than the sum of the two bodies
themselves. (That is, the magnitude of the total 4-momentum vector is
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greater than the sum of the magnitudes of the two component 4-momentum
vectors, as was the case with the gas.) When the two bodies collide inelas-
tically, each changes its 4-momentum orientation such that both come to
be oriented in the same direction. Because the 2-body system is isolated,
however, the total 4-momentum before and after collision must remain the
same. This means that when the colliding bodies change their 4-momenta
upon impact, their new 4-momentum vectors must each be oriented in the
same direction as the total system 4-momentum prior to impact and must
preserve the magnitude of the total system 4-momentum prior to impact.
But this can only happen if, when the orientations change upon impact,
their magnitudes increase as well. This means that the mass of each body
goes up upon impact, which is why if the resulting body post-collision were
cut in half, each half would exhibit more inertial resistance than it did pre-
collision. Of course, this consequence is an explanation at the ‘principle’
level—it doesn’t tell us anything about the underlying dynamical mecha-
nism in virtue of which this change might be brought about. That point
will be addressed in the next section and lies at the heart of what is truly
novel about special relativistic particle dynamics.
9 Elementary Conversion and E0 = mc
2
Let us (finally) address perhaps the most puzzling case of all—apparent cases
of genuine conversion between mass and energy in the context of elementary
particle collisions. What might really be going on in these reactions, at
least when viewed through the lens of special relativistic particle dynamics?
Recall that in electron and positron creation collisions the incoming photons
are massless but the outgoing particles have mass. How do we reconcile
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what’s occurring with the principles of special relativity, without appealing
to kinetic energy as a fundamental physical property?
If we consider the system of colliding photons that initiate the collision
reaction, their 4-momenta (in green) are represented in the following center-
of-momentum frame diagram:
ct
x
The 2-photon system as a whole clearly possesses a non-zero 4-momentum
magnitude (and hence a non-zero mass), even though neither constituent
does. According to the 4-Momentum Collision Principle this total 4-momentum
gets preserved in the interaction, as in the following diagram:
ct
x
As with the inelastic collision case, we can straightforwardly deduce from
the 4-Momentum Collision Principle that the output particles will exhibit
different inertial resistances than the inputs. For the inertial resistances of
the output particles are determined by their 4-momentum magnitudes, and
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those in turn are determined by the 4-momentum magnitudes and orienta-
tions of the input particles in accordance with the 4-Momentum Collision
Principle. There is a genuine transformation of objective physical properties
in this reaction, but it’s not a conversion between mass and energy. What
changes in the course of the reaction are simply the magnitudes and orien-
tations of the constituent 4-momenta. Mass is not created out of something
else, as the original puzzle seemed to suggest. The transformation in this
reaction is from one set of 4-momenta magnitudes and orientations to an-
other. Mass (as 4-momentum magnitude) simply arises in virtue of these
changes.
Still, what we want—what is needed to complete the picture in a satisfy-
ing way—is some account of the dynamics that underpins this transforma-
tion. Can a dynamical story be given, in terms of 4-momentum magnitudes
and orientations, according to which constituent masses ‘emerge’ in this
reaction? This is something that my interpretation of special relativistic
particle ontology ought to provide. (Again, we shouldn’t expect special rel-
ativity to offer an explanation of this specific collision reaction, which is
quantum in nature.)
The answer, I think, turns on the nature and reality of 4-forces. When
the incoming constituents collide, they experience 4-forces that change their
4-momenta. Most 4-forces are such that they change only the orientation
but not the magnitude of a particle’s 4-momentum, as in the case of the
heated gas. A 4-force of this sort has (in a frame) the following components:
Fµ = γu(cm
dγu
dt
, f),
where the associated relativistic 3-force
f = m
dγu
dt
u+ γuma
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is called a ‘pure’ force. The electromagnetic force on a charged body is
the canonical example of a pure 3-force. As Rindler (1991, p.92) shows, a
necessary and sufficient condition for a 3-force to be pure is that its asso-
ciated 4-force F always satisfies U · F = 0. As a consequence, if a 4-force
always acts orthogonally in Minkowski spacetime to a particles 4-velocity
(4-momentum), then the magnitude of the 4-momentum will be preserved.
However, a second possibility is also built into the dynamical structure of
F = dPdτ – namely, that a 4-force might act in such a way as to change the
magnitude of a particle’s 4-momentum. Such forces can be expressed in a
frame as
Fµ = γu(cm
dγu
dt
+ cγu
dm
dt
, f),
and their associated 3-forces
f = (m
dγu
dt
+ γu
dm
dt
)u+ γuma
are said to be ‘impure’. By their dynamical action alone, 4-forces of this
sort are capable of changing the mass of a particle.47 Naturally, a necessary
and sufficient condition for a 3-force to be impure is that U ·F 6= 0 hold for
the associated 4-force. Rindler (1991, p.92) shows using this condition that
any 4-force derivable from a 4-scalar potential Φ via an equation of the form
Fµ =
∂Φ
∂xµ , such as the scalar meson theory of the nucleus, must be impure.
Return now to the electron-positron creation reaction and to a diagram
of possible timelike oriented outputs:
47A special case of such forces are what Rindler (1991, p.92) dubs ‘heatlike’ forces, the
action of which only changes a particles 4-momentum magnitude and not its orientation.
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ct
x
As one can see from the diagram, if the outputs are not null-oriented the
4-forces applied must be such that U ·F 6= 0. (Recall that for a null 4-vector
U in Minkowski spacetime, U·F = 0 iff F is parallel to U.) So if the 4-forces
exerted are such that they change the orientations of null 4-momenta, they
must also change their magnitudes. This holds because the applied forces in
the reaction (whatever they are exactly) must be impure, and it drops right
out of the dynamical equations.48
Mass, then, as the property of inertial resistance, can be created and
destroyed in special relativistic dynamics, and it is changes in 4-momenta
magnitudes brought about by impure 4-forces that provide the dynamical
mechanisms for these changes.49 This is what is truly dynamically novel
about special relativistic particle mechanics: mass can be created and de-
stroyed by 4-forces. Now, as it happens, the application of a 4-force (in
general) also changes the energy of a particle, although the rate of that
change—just like the magnitude and the spatial direction of the 3-force—is
frame-dependent. This misleads us into thinking that in some cases there
48A similar story can be given for the case of inelastic collisions, as discussed in the
preceding section. Evidently the 4-forces at work in such a collision must be impure so as
to change the magnitudes of the incoming particles’ 4-momenta.
49Many textbooks are blithely indifferent to the possibility of impure forces. See, e.g.,
French (1968, p.215) and Freund (2008, p.192), where dm
dt
= 0 is assumed without any
comment whatsoever.
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is a conversion between energy and mass. But there is no such conversion.
Instead, what happens is that impure 4-forces change the 4-momentum mag-
nitudes of the particles on which they act while also changing the energies
of those particles. What E0 = mc
2 tells us is how changes in particle mass
brought about by 4-forces are correlated with changes in energy brought about
by those same 4-forces.50 But the change in mass is a fundamental physical
change, whereas the change in energy is a change in a non-fundamental or
derivative property. That there is a precise and fixed correspondence be-
tween these two changes is an important empirical fact, arising from the
action of 4-forces and facts about their frame-dependent decompositions. In
this sense E = mc2 does encode a profound and novel dynamical discovery,
but that discovery can’t be read off of the equation itself and it holds in
virtue of the nature and existence of 4-forces.51 E0 = mc
2 does not mean
what it is often taken to mean, or what Einstein took it to mean.
10 Conclusion
Although often taken to be the central insight of special relativistic particle
dynamics, the alleged equivalence between energy and mass expressed in
Einstein’s famous equation E0 = mc
2 remains both controversial amongst
physicists and conceptually problematic, as it contravenes a central princi-
ple regarding the content and interpretation of special relativity—namely,
that all inertial frames are physically equivalent. Nevertheless, the apparent
inter-convertability of energy and mass seems to have prima facie exper-
50In this sense, one really ought to stick to writing the equation as ∆E0 = ∆mc
2, which
is the form that actually gets used in physical practice.
51The ontology proposed here deals with the apparent reality of energy released in, say,
a nuclear explosion by saying that the energy released is a frame-dependent effect of the
4-momentum magnitudes changing on account of the applied (impure) 4-forces.
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imental support. In this paper I have proposed a specific account of the
fundamental ontology of special relativistic particle dynamics that resolves
this tension. In the process, I have argued that the core dynamical insight of
special relativity lies not in any relationship between energy and mass, but
rather in the recognition that the frame-independent application of 4-forces
to particles can in some cases actually bring about changes in particle mass.
That changes in a primitive property (mass) are correlated with changes in a
derivative property (energy) is a byproduct of that fundamental dynamical
fact.
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